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FOOLS, KNAVES, AND THE PROTECTION
OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH: A RESPONSE
TO PROFESSOR REDISH
James Weinstein*
I. INTRODUCTION
An unfortunate tendency among some legal academics is to
become so persuaded by their own arguments that they conclude that
anyone who does not agree with them must be either a fool or a
knave. Professor Martin H. Redish's contribution to this Symposium
provides a good example of this phenomenon. Redish believes that
his argument that commercial speech deserves full First Amendment
protection is so ironclad that anyone who continues to resist its force
is either "illogical"' or is engaged in invidious "viewpoint
discrimination" grounded in "ideological hostility to the premises of
capitalism and commercialism." 2 This claim is much too overstated
to be tenable.
Now, some who oppose strong First Amendment protection for
commercial speech3 may do so out of hostility to capitalism and
* Amelia D. Lewis Professor of Constitutional Law, Sandra Day O'Connor College of
Law at Arizona State University. I am grateful to Larry Alexander, Ed Baker, Arthur Hellman,
Robert Post and Marty Redish for their helpful comments and criticisms in reviewing earlier
drafts of this article, and to David Ferrucci for his valuable research assistance.
1. Martin H. Redish, Commercial Speech, First Amendment Intuition and the Twilight Zone
of Viewpoint Discrimination, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 67 (2007); see infra text accompanying notes
21-22.
2. Id. at 130-31 ("It is time to recognize opposition to commercial speech protection for
what it all too often is: a form of ideological hostility to the premises of capitalism and
commercialism.").
3. Id. The Supreme Court has offered various definitions of commercial speech, but the
one that it usually employs is speech that "does 'no more than propose a commercial
transaction."' Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
762 (1976) (quoting Pittsburg Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376, 385 (1973)); accord Redish, supra note 1, at 75 ("It is probably reasonable to conclude that,
at this point, the Court has unambiguously adopted the view that commercial speech is confined
to expression advocating purchase."). In any event, this is what I mean by the term "commercial
speech" as used in this article.
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commercialism. 4  But there are simply too many people whose
opposition to extending "full" protection to commercial speech is
obviously not infected with any such animus for Redish's broad-
based charge to be plausible. For instance, Chief Justices William
Rehnquist' and Warren Burger, Justices Lewis Powell, Potter
Stewart, Byron White,6 Sandra Day O'Connor,7 and Judge Richard
The currently applicable test for regulating commercial speech is set forth in Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). Under
this test, to come within the coverage of the First Amendment, commercial speech "must concern
lawful activity and not be misleading." Id. But even if the speech thus comes within the
coverage of the First Amendment, a content-based regulation will nonetheless be valid if the
government can show that it has a "substantial" interest for regulating the speech; that the
"regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted"; and that the regulation "is not
more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest." Id. This is a form of "intermediate
scrutiny." See Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623 (1995). Several Justices have
criticized the application of the Central Hudson test to bans on "truthful, nonmisleading
commercial messages for reasons unrelated to the preservation of a fair bargaining process" and
would instead apply "rigorous review" to such regulations. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island,
517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996) (plurality opinion of Stevens, J., joined by Kennedy and Ginsburg, JJ.);
see also id. at 518 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that a governmental interest in "keep[ing]
legal users of a product or service ignorant in order to manipulate their choices in the
marketplace" is "per se illegitimate") (emphasis omitted). Nonetheless, Central Hudson remains
the standard for assessing the validity of content-based restrictions on commercial speech. See,
e.g., Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 184 (1999) (noting that
although Central Hudson has been criticized by judges, scholars and litigants, the test is "an
established part of our constitutional jurisprudence" and "provides an adequate basis for decision"
in this case).
4. For instance, Professor Steven Shiffirin's remarks at the conference on which this
symposium is based suggest that his view that commercial speech should receive limited First
Amendment protection may be influenced by antipathy towards commercialism. ("Two hundred
and sixty-five billion dollars are spent on advertising. That, it seems to me, contributes to exactly
the kind of citizens who are materialistic, hedonistic, not much caring to participate in politics,
and the value of commercial speech, it seems to me, is problematic."). Steven Shiffrin, Remarks
at the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Symposium: Commercial Speech: Past, Present &
Future (Feb. 23-24, 2007), in Thoughts on Commercial Speech: A Roundtable Discussion, 41
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 333, 347 (2007); see also Steven H. Shiffrin, The First Amendment and
Economic Regulation: Away From a General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 Nw. U. L. REV.
1212 (1983) ("[A] basis for the discrimination [between commercial and non-commercial speech]
is that commercial speakers are lining their pockets, seeking profit, and treating people as objects
for exploitation while political and religious speakers are advancing a cause and seeking personal
contact. Obviously this rationale is both overinclusive and underinclusive .... [But it contains]
some appeal as a general matter.").
5. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 404 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("I
continue to believe that the First Amendment speech provision, long regarded by this Court as a
sanctuary for expressions of public importance or intellectual interest, is demeaned by invocation
to protect advertisements of goods and services. I would hold quite simply that appellants'
advertisement ... is not the sort of expression that the Amendment was adopted to protect.").
6. In Central Hudson, over Justices Harry Blackmun and William Brennan's objection that
the Court's test did not provide "adequate protection for truthful, nonmisleading, noncoercive
commercial speech," 447 U.S. at 573 (Blackmun, J., concurring), Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Stewart, White, (as well as Marshall) joined Justice Powell's majority opinion, which
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Posner' have all gone on record against extending "full" protection to
commercial speech.9 Are we really to believe that it was antipathy
developed the test of "intermediate" scrutiny still applicable to regulation of commercial speech.
See id. at 566 (majority opinion).
7. During her tenure on the Court, Justice O'Connor consistently supported less than "full"
protection for commercial speech. See, e.g., Fla. Bar, 515 U.S. at 623 ("We have always been
careful to distinguish commercial speech from speech at the First Amendment's core.
'[C]ommercial speech [enjoys] a limited measure of protection, commensurate with its
subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values,' and is subject to 'modes of
regulation that might be impermissible in the realm of noncommercial expression."' (alterations
in original) (quoting Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989) (quoting
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978))). And in 44 Liquormart, Justice
O'Connor declined to join Justice Stevens's opinion urging "rigorous review" of bans on the
dissemination of truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech "for reasons unrelated to the
preservation of a fair bargaining process," 517 U.S. at 501 (opinion of Stevens, J., joined by
Kennedy & Ginsburg, JJ.), and instead applied the Central Hudson test. See id. at 529-34
(O'Connor, J., concurring, joined by Rehnquist, C.J. and Souter & Breyer, JJ.).
8. Richard A. Posner, Free Speech in an Economic Perspective, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1,
39-40 (1986) ("Also sensible from an economic standpoint is the lesser protection given to
speech or writing that is intended as commercial advertising .... A more radical proposition is
possible: that there should be no constitutional protection for commercial advertising.").
Other commentators whom no one could reasonably accuse of harboring anti-capitalist
sentiments would similarly deny ordinary commercial speech the same protection as political
speech. See, e.g., Lillian R. BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry into
the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299, 355 (1978) ("The Court's extension
of first amendment protection to the commercial speech situations that have arisen so far, because
it is not justified either by principle or by pragmatic or institutional concerns related to principle,
must be characterized as illegitimate."); Robert H. Bork, Activist FDA Threatens Constitutional
Speech Rights, LEGAL BACKGROUNDER (Washington Legal Foundation, Jan. 19, 1996),
http://www.aei.org/publications/publD.18934,filter.social/pub-detail.asp (arguing for protection
of truthful, nonmisleading commercial advertising based on the original understanding of the
First Amendment, but noting that consistent with the common law tradition against commercial
misrepresentation that "[tihe government may act to police the veracity of commercial speech,
whereas its ability to regulate 'false' or misleading political speech is far more constrained").
For what it's worth, I count myself among those who favor capitalism, market solutions,
and free trade, but who do not believe that commercial speech is entitled to "full" First
Amendment protection. For a discussion of the meaning of "full" First Amendment protection,
see infra text accompanying note 31.
9. Justice Scalia, someone else whom we can confidently acquit of hostility towards
capitalism and commercialism, has also frequently applied or joined in opinions that apply the
Central Hudson test. See, e.g., Fox, 492 U.S. at 477 (applying Central Hudson to uphold a ban
on the selling of commercial products in dormitories, and explaining that the "no more extensive
than reasonably necessary" requirement does not impose the "least restrictive" alternative
requirement proper to strict scrutiny). However, in 44 Liquormart, Scalia expressed "discomfort"
with the Central Hudson test, which seemed to him "to have nothing more than policy intuition to
support it." 517 U.S. at 517 (Scalia, J., concurring). In his view, the proper level of protection
for commercial speech should be determined by the legislative practices prevalent at the time that
the First and Fourteenth Amendments were adopted. Since the briefs and arguments of the
parties in 44 Liquormart did not address this issue, he applied the Central Hudson test. Id. at 517.
See also Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 571-72 (2001) (Kennedy, J., concurring
in part), in which Justice Scalia joined Justice Kennedy's expression of "concern" that the
Central Hudson test "gives insufficient protection to truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech."
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toward capitalism and commercialism that lead this bevy of
conservative and moderate jurists to support less than strict scrutiny
for regulation of commercial speech?"0 Or that all those courts in the
various jurisdictions throughout the world that give commercial
speech less protection than political expression-including the
European Union,1 the United Kingdom," Germany,13 Australia,14 and
Canada' 5-are infected by hostility towards capitalism and
commercialism?
10. Redish seeks to explain away these numerous and thus fatal counterexamples to his
thesis by arguing that these jurists and scholars have a "skimpy" and "grossly underprotective"
view of free speech. See Redish, supra note 1, at 122. While this may explain Rehnquist and
Bork, it does not account for Powell, Burger, O'Connor, White, Scalia, BeVier, or Posner, or the
host of other jurists and scholars who have at least a modestly broad view of free speech
protection but do not believe that commercial speech is deserving of the highest degree of judicial
protection.
Indeed, no Justice of the Supreme Court has advocated "full" protection in the sense that
Redish uses the term. Contrary to even those Justices most protective of commercial speech (and
Robert Bork as well, see supra note 8), Redish believes that commercial speech and political
expression should be treated identically. Thus, he has previously argued that "false commercial
speech, much like most false political speech, should be measured by the 'actual malice' test of
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan." Redish, supra note 1, at 75 n.27 (citation omitted) (citing
MARTIN H. REDISH, MONEY TALKS: SPEECH, ECONOMIC POWER, AND THE VALUES OF
DEMOCRACY 55-56 (2001)). Though for the sake of "intellectual simplicity" Redish focuses his
critique in this Symposium to those who argue for no or reduced protection for truthful
commercial speech, see Redish, supra note 1 at n.27, his position that commercial and political
speech should be treated identically even with respect to false statements raises the question of
whether Redish believes that to the extent they disagree with this position the entire membership
of the United States Supreme Court, both past and present, are also guilty of furtive viewpoint
discrimination.
11. Church of Scientology v. Sweden, App. No. 7805/77, 16 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. &
Rep. 68, 73 (1979) ("Although the Commission is not of the opinion that commercial 'speech' as
such is outside the protection conferred by Article 10 (1), it considers that the level of protection
must be less than that accorded to the expression of 'political' ideas .... ).
12. See R. v. Adver. Standards Auth., [2000] E.H.L.R. 463, 472 (H.C.) ("The indications are
that commercial expression is not regarded as so worthy of protection as political or even artistic
expression ....").
13. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., A Comparative Perspective on the First Amendment.
Free Speech, Militant Democracy, and the Primacy of Dignity as a Preferred Constitutional
Value in Germany, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1549, 1583-84 (2004) ("[N]o commercial speech doctrine
exists in Germany; the Federal Constitutional Court has sustained both legislation limiting
advertising by pharmacies and banning advertising by physicians on the theory that commercial
advertising does not implicate Article 5 [the provision of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic
of Germany governing freedom of expression] values in a meaningful way.").
14. See Theophanous v. Herald & Weekly Times Ltd., (1994) 182 C.L.R. 104, 124 (Austl.)
("[S]peech which is simply aimed at selling goods and services and enhancing profit-making
activities will ordinarily fall outside the area of constitutional protection.").
15. Although "there is no distinctive 'commercial speech doctrine' as there is in the United
States," the Supreme Court of Canada "takes the value of the expression into account when
determining whether its restriction is justified under section 1 of the Charter; commercial
expression is entitled to less weight than political speech." ERIC BARENDT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH
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These numerous examples belying Redish's broad charge of
viewpoint discrimination reflect the various legitimate grounds for
denying commercial speech the extremely rigorous protection
afforded political expression, including the fact that "restrictions" on
commercial speech "do not often repress individual self-expression;
they rarely interfere with the functioning of democratic political
processes; and they often reflect a democratically determined
governmental decision to regulate a commercial venture in order to
protect, for example, the consumer, the public health, individual
safety, or the environment."16 In addition, there is greater reason to
mistrust government when it seeks to regulate speech critical of it or
its policies than when it regulates ordinary commercial advertising. 7
Of course, it is perfectly appropriate to argue, as Redish does, that
none of these reasons for giving commercial speech less protection
than political speech is persuasive, either alone or in combination.
But it does not do much to advance the inquiry to claim further that
406-07 (2d ed. 2005) (citing the judgment of McLachlin, J., in Royal College of Dental Surgeons
of Ontario v. Rocket, [1990] 71 D.L.R. 68, 75, 79).
16. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 388 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Regulation of commercial speech does not "often repress individual self-expression" because, as I
have explained, the First Amendment is concerned primarily with the expressive rights of
individuals, not collective entities such as ordinary business entities. See James Weinstein,
Speech Categorization and the Limits of First Amendment Formalism: Lessons from Nike v.
Kasky, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1091, 1115-16 (2004). Redish correctly notes that "the values
of free speech can be fostered by the receipt, as well as by the communication, of expression."
Redish, supra note 1, at 87. But he is wrong when he insists further that "then it should logically
make no difference whether the speaker itself deserves the benefits of the constitutional
protection." Id. As I explain in greater detail below, when there is no constitutionally relevant
speaker, then the speech at issue is usually valued only instrumentally, not because it is
constitutive of some core free speech norm such as the right to participate in the political process.
See infra text accompanying notes 58-61.
17. Redish argues that because "the legislative regulatory process is fraught with dangers of
rent-seeking or improper influence by special interests and private parties," there is "no reason to
believe that these dangers are any less when the subject of regulation is commercial, rather than
political, behavior." Redish, supra note 1, at 94. He thus suggests that a legislature "captured"
by a particular industry might pass laws invidiously restricting the advertising of competitors of
this favored industry. Id. I have no doubt that Redish is correct that legislatures sometimes
corruptly favor one economic interest over another, and might even do so by selective
suppression of commercial advertising. It is even possible, though I think extremely unlikely,
that for this reason Redish is right that the danger of the government illegitimately suppressing
political speech is no greater than the risk of it improperly suppressing commercial speech. But
in the absence of conclusive proof of this assertion, Redish simply has no basis to accuse those
who do not agree with this highly counterintuitive surmise of holding a "logically indefensible"
and thus "viewpoint driven" position. Redish, supra note 1, at 122. His analogy to those who
would support something as truly logically indefensible as the suppression of anti-war but not
pro-war literature on Michigan Avenue during rush hour, id. at 71-72, 115, is therefore singularly
inapt.
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virtually everyone who holds that view is motivated by hostility to
capitalism and commercialism. 8
Redish's charge is reminiscent of the similarly provocative but
equally untenable accusations that opponents of affirmative action
are motivated by racist animus, or that advocates of a sharp
separation of church and state are hostile to religion. No doubt some
of those who oppose preferential law school admission for minorities
are racists, just as some of those who oppose prayer in public school
are hostile toward religion. But the host of legitimate reasons for
opposing either of these practices, together with the intractable
problem of determining what truly motivates people in holding
various beliefs, makes broad accusations such as these both unfair
and unhelpful to a constructive dialogue. Similarly, the various
legitimate and plausible reasons supporting the view that commercial
speech should be afforded less protection than political speech are
sufficient to rebut the charge that those who advocate less than "full"
protection for commercial speech are engaged in invidious viewpoint
discrimination. 9 In any event, this is basically all I have to say about
Redish's grossly overstated charge that opposition to commercial
speech protection usually reflects a form of ideological hostility to
capitalism and commercialism.
18. Indeed, far from evincing hostility to capitalism and commercialism, the view that
commercial speech should be subject to greater regulation than political speech might be
motivated by the belief that false or misleading commercial speech should be strictly forbidden
because it impairs the efficient functioning of free markets; but that forbidding false or
misleading political speech, which though in theory is similarly inimical to the political process,
would be both dangerous and impractical.
19. More tenable is the particularized charge of viewpoint discrimination leveled against
those who exclude commercial speech from an otherwise very broad view of speech protection.
See Redish, supra note 1, at 71-72; see also infra text accompanying notes 23-27 (discussing the
view that all speech is entitled to full First Amendment protection). Redish would have been on
much firmer ground if he had limited his accusation of invidious viewpoint discrimination to such
jurists and scholars. Although I might have doubts about whether even this more limited charge
of bad motivation would be useful, I do agree that those who thus single out commercial speech
for lesser protection have, in the immortal words of Ricky Ricardo, "some 'splainin' to do."
In this regard it is interesting to note that, at least among Supreme Court Justices, there
do not seem to be any good candidates for such viewpoint discriminatory motivation. To the
contrary, those Justices who broadly extend rigorous protection to speech (e.g., Justices Brennan,
Blackmun, Stevens, Kennedy, and Ginsburg) have also been among those who have urged
greatest protection for commercial speech. See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 573-79 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring, joined by Brennan, J.);
44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501-04 (1996) (opinion of Stevens, J., joined
by Kennedy & Ginsburg, JJ.).
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More worthy of extended discussion is Redish's argument
directed toward those opponents of "full" protection for commercial
speech who he acknowledges might not be engaged in such invidious
viewpoint discrimination. Redish thus allows that it might not be
unprincipled for "one starting from the premise that the First
Amendment is primarily or exclusively designed to protect speech
relevant to the political process" to conclude that commercial speech
deserves "little or no First Amendment protection."2 But while such
a position may not, according to Redish, evince "furtive" viewpoint
discrimination, 1 it is nonetheless in his view an "illogical" position
that "makes absolutely no sense" because individual and collective
self-governance are both "grounded in identical normative concerns
about self-development and self-determination."2
As I will show, the opportunity to participate in the speech by
which collective decisions are made promotes the core democratic
precepts of equality and legitimacy, which are "normative concerns"
quite different from the values promoted by the protection of
commercial speech. Thus, far from being "illogical," the position
that ordinary commercial speech should be afforded less protection
than political expression flows from the view that the core First
Amendment value is democratic self-governance, not, as Redish
believes, self-realization. But before examining the relationship
between collective and individual self-governance in more detail, it
is necessary first to discuss the structure of free speech doctrine and
its underlying values. This discussion will, in addition, help clarify
what is meant by "fully protected" speech, an ambiguous term that
plays a crucial role in Redish's critique.
20. Redish, supra note 1, at 80-81.
21. Id. at 122. Redish's allowance that there may be an exception from his charge that those
who oppose full protection of commercial speech are engaged in viewpoint discrimination is,
however, an extremely narrow one. In his view, even those who believe that the First
Amendment is primarily designed to protect speech relevant to the political process are guilty of
ideological hostility toward capitalism and commercialism if they do not also include publications
such as Consumer Reports as unworthy of"full" First Amendment protection. See id. at 122-23.
Like his broader claim on viewpoint discrimination, this attempt to impose a shibboleth to detect
hostility toward capitalism and commercialism among those who believe that the primary purpose
of free speech is to protect political speech is unpersuasive. However, because this charge
requires an examination of what is meant by "full" First Amendment protection, see infra text
accompanying notes 3 1, I will postpone further discussion of this point until after that discussion.
See infra note 75.
22. Redish, supra note 1, at 81.
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II. FREE SPEECH STRUCTURE AND VALUES
A. Structure
Under a commonly held view aptly dubbed the "All Inclusive
Approach, 23 "all speech receives First Amendment protection unless
it falls with[in] certain narrow categories of expression ... such as
incitement of imminent illegal conduct, intentional libel, obscenity,
child pornography, fighting words, and true threats."24 On this view,
unless the speech falls into one of these forlorn categories, any law
that regulates speech because of its content will be subject to strict
scrutiny.25 This appears to be the view that Redish takes of the
structure of free speech doctrine. 6  Under the All Inclusive
Approach, the failure to treat commercial speech as "fully protected
speech" would certainly seem anomalous and would raise the
question of why commercial speech is singled out for discriminatory
treatment.27
The All Inclusive Approach is not, however, an accurate
description of the structure of free speech doctrine. In addition to
the traditional exceptions already mentioned, one need only consider
23. Barry P. McDonald, Government Regulation or Other "Abridgments" of Scientific
Research: The Proper Scope of Judicial Review Under the First Amendment, 54 EMORY L.J. 979,
1009 (2005).
24. Id. I previously published a substantially similar critique of the All Inclusive Approach
in James Weinstein, Institutional Review Boards and the Constitution, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 493,
535-36 (2007).
25. McDonald, supra note 23, at 1009. For other statements of the All Inclusive Approach,
or variations of it, see, for example, JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW § 16.47, at 1226 (6th ed. 2000) ("A content-based restriction of [speech] is valid only if it
fits within a category of speech that the First Amendment does not protect, for example,
obscenity."), and EUGENE VOLOKH, THE FIRST AMENDMENT: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND POLICY
ARGUMENTS 2 (2001) (stating that besides the traditional "exceptions," the settings in which
government may regulate the content of speech are confined to those in which it is acting as
proprietor or educator rather than as sovereign).
26. As a normative matter, Redish would go even further and afford "full" protection to all
human expression, even those categories excluded by the All Inclusive Approach. See Martin H.
Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 625-29 (1982).
27. See Redish, supra note 1, at 70.
28. See JAMES WEINSTEIN, HATE SPEECH, PORNOGRAPHY AND THE RADICAL ATTACK ON
FREE SPEECH DOCTRINE 40-43 (1999); Weinstein, supra note 24, at 535-36; see also Garcetti v.
Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1973 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("Because virtually all human
interaction takes place through speech, the First Amendment cannot offer all speech the same
degree of protection. Rather, judges must apply different protective presumptions in different
contexts, scrutinizing government's speech-related restrictions differently depending upon the
general category of activity.").
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the large range of speech regulated by securities, antitrust, labor,
copyright, food and drug, and health and safety laws, together with
the array of speech regulated by the common law of contract,
negligence and fraud, all without a hint of interference from the First
Amendment, to quickly realize that there is a multitude of
"exceptions" beyond the few recognized by the All Inclusive
Approach.29  A more accurate snapshot of First Amendment
protection is almost the photonegative of the All Inclusive Approach:
highly protected speech is the exception, with most other speech
being regulable with no discernable First Amendment constraint,"
or, like commercial speech, receiving some, but not the most
rigorous, protection.
So if by "full" First Amendment protection Redish means the
intense scrutiny that would be applied, for instance, to an ordinance
that prohibited anyone speaking on a street corner or in a public park
from criticizing the war in Iraq, then there is nothing anomalous
about extending less than "full" protection to ordinary commercial
speech. As Professor Robert Post has demonstrated, and I discuss in
more detail elsewhere, this extremely rigorous protection applies
primarily within the domain of "public discourse"3 '-that is, to
expression on matters of public concern in settings dedicated or
essential to democratic self-governance, such as books, magazines,
films, the Internet, or in public forums such as the speaker's corner
of the park. It is in this realm that the people, the ultimate source of
political authority in a democracy, can freely examine and discuss
the rules, norms, and conditions that constitute society. If, to the
29. See Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary
Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1768, 1778-84 (2003); see also
Weinstein, supra note 16, at 1097-98.
30. See Schauer, supra note 29, at 1768 (observing that "even the briefest glimpse at the vast
universe of widely accepted content-based restrictions on communication reveals that the speech
with which the First Amendment deals is the exception and the speech that may routinely be
regulated is the rule"); Ronald Dworkin, The Curse of American Politics, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Oct.
17, 1996, at 21 n. 15 ("Constitutional lawyers often . . . say that all constraints on speech are
banned in principle, and that exceptions must be justified, one by one, as special. But the vast
range of acts of speech that are plainly not protected by the First Amendment makes it
analytically clearer to say that it is protected speech that is special."). For a trenchant criticism of
the All Inclusive Approach, both generally and as a method for determining the protection
afforded scientific speech, see Robert C. Post, Encryption Source Code and the First Amendment,
15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 713, 715-17 (2000).
31. Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion,
Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 603, 604 (1990);
Weinstein, supra note 16, at 1096.
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contrary, government were allowed to manage the content of this
discussion, either by excluding certain ideas as wrong, offensive, or
even dangerous, or by setting the agenda, the opinion formed by
public discussion would reflect not the will of the people, but the
preferences of those temporarily entrusted to govern society.
32
However, precisely because public discourse in the United
States is so strongly protected, the realm dedicated to such
expression cannot be conceived as covering the entire expanse of
human expression. Just as it is imperative in a democracy to have a
realm in which any idea can be questioned as vituperatively as the
speaker chooses, there must be other settings in which the
government may efficiently carry out the results yielded by the
democratic process. Thus, in settings dedicated to some purpose
other than public discourse-such as those dedicated to effectuating
government programs in the government workplace,33  the
administration of justice in the courtroom,34 or instruction in public
schools 35-the government has far greater leeway to regulate the
content of speech.36
This pattern of highly protected speech within public discourse
and readily regulable speech outside that domain is perhaps most
starkly apparent with respect to First Amendment limitations on
defamation suits. When allegedly defamatory speech concerns a
32. As James Madison declared in denouncing the Alien & Sedition Act, "The people, not
the government, possess the absolute sovereignty." N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
274 (1964) (quoting 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 569-70 (1876)).
33. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983) (holding that the discharge of
assistant district attorney for criticism of her superior did not violate the First Amendment).
34. See Jackson v. Bailey, 605 A.2d 1350, 1359 (Conn. 1992) (upholding a contempt
conviction for using profanity in the courtroom); State v. Lingwall, 637 N.W.2d 311, 315 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2001) (same); Dargi v. Terminex Int'l Co., 23 S.W.3d 342, 346 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000)
(upholding contempt conviction for use of profanity during a deposition).
35. See Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2622 (2007) (upholding against First
Amendment challenge discipline of a student for holding up a banner at a school sponsored event
that could be reasonably regarded as advocating drug use); Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S.
675, 685 (1986) (rejecting a First Amendment challenge by a student suspended for using
"offensively lewd and indecent speech" at a high school assembly); Bonnell v. Lorenzo, 2001
FED App. 0057P at 36-37 (6th Cir.) (holding that a university instructor's suspension for using
profane language in class did not violate the First Amendment).
36. See ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY,
MANAGEMENT 200-01 (1995) (noting that unlike in the "public realm[,]... in which all goals or
objectives are open to discussion and modification[,]" in nonpublic forums or "managerial"
domains, the state is "permitted to regulate speech as necessary to achieve certain specified
objectives").
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public official or figure, stringent First Amendment protection
applies;3 7 similarly, even when the speech is about a private person,
considerable First Amendment protection is available if the speech is
on a matter of public concern.38 But if the speech addresses a matter
of purely private concern, no First Amendment limitations restrain
the normal operation of defamation law.39
This special constitutional immunity for speech on matters of
public concern was extended to the criminal law in Bartnicki v.
Vopper,4 ° which involved a federal law making it a crime to intercept
cellular telephone conversations or publish the contents of such a
conversation if the publisher had reason to know that the
conversation had been illegally intercepted.' The Supreme Court
held that because the illegally intercepted conversation at issue in
that case was "truthful information of public concern," it was
unconstitutional to impose either civil or criminal liability on
someone (not involved with the illegal intercept) for publishing the
contents of the conversation. 2 The Court noted, however, that such
immunity might not attach if the conversation was of purely private
concern.43 This pattern of highly protected speech within public
discourse but readily regulable speech outside that realm is repeated
throughout free speech doctrine." Whatever other First Amendment
37. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 283.
38. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345-46 (1974).
39. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761-63 (1985).
40. 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
41. Id. at 520.
42. Id. at 533-34.
43. Id. at 533 ("We need not decide whether [such First Amendment immunity would
attach] to disclosures of trade secrets or domestic gossip or other information of purely private
concern."); see id. at 535-36 (Breyer & O'Connor, JJ., concurring) (joining the Court's opinion
because of its "narrow" holding) ("[T]he information publicized involved a matter of unusual
public concern, namely, a threat of potential physical harm to others.").
44. For example, a lawyer has a First Amendment right to solicit clients when "seeking to
further political and ideological goals" through litigation but not for ordinary economic reasons.
Compare In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 414, 439 (1978) (holding that First Amendment prohibits
discipline of a lawyer for soliciting a client for public interest litigation), with Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978) (finding no First Amendment bar to discipline of
lawyer for in person solicitation of clients in ordinary personal injury case). Similarly, politically
motivated economic boycotts receive rigorous First Amendment protection, while ordinary
economic boycotts receive no First Amendment protection whatsoever. Compare NAACP v.
Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 911-12 (1982) (holding the First Amendment protects
speech related to boycott seeking to bring about racial integration and equality), with FTC v.
Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 426-28 (1990) (holding the First Amendment
does not protect boycott by lawyers aimed at increasing their own compensation).
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value it may have, speech that "does no more than propose a
commercial transaction"45 is not part of the speech by which we
govern ourselves. 46 Accordingly, when viewed against the back-
ground of the massive amount of speech that is entitled to no or
limited First Amendment protection, the fact that ordinary
commercial speech is not entitled to the rigorous protection primarily
reserved for public discourse seems neither anomalous nor
suspicious. To the contrary, seen from this perspective, it would be
the extension of such rigorous protection to ordinary commercial
speech that would require explanation.
B. Values
47
As the reservation of rigorous First Amendment protection
primarily for public discourse suggests, the value that best explains
the pattern of the Court's free speech decisions is a commitment to
democratic self-governance. While there is vigorous disagreement
about what other values might also be central to the First
Amendment, there is "practically universal agreement" that at least
one such core norm is democracy. 48  In its narrowest but most
45. See supra note 3.
46. For further discussion of why ordinary commercial speech is not part of public
discourse, see infra text accompanying notes 83-85.
47. A substantially similar version of the discussion in this subpart previously appeared in
Weinstein, supra note 24, at 512-19.
48. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) ("Whatever differences may exist about
interpretations of the First Amendment, there is practically universal agreement that a major
purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs."); see also
Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2626 (2007) ("Political speech, of course, is 'at the core of
what the First Amendment is designed to protect."' (quoting Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 365
(2003))); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 410-11 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
("I begin with a proposition that ought to be unassailable: Political speech is the primary object of
First Amendment protection."); Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 913 (explaining that because
speech concerning public affairs "is the essence of self-government," such expression "has
always rested on the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values"); Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) ("The protection given speech and press was fashioned to assure
unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by
the people."); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) ("The maintenance of the
opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will
of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to the
security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system."); Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("Those who won our
independence believed that ... public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a
fundamental principle of the American government."); Cass R. Sunstein, Half-Truths of the First
Amendment, 1993 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 25, 25 ("[W]hatever else it is about, the First Amendment is
at least partly designed to create a well-functioning deliberative democracy.").
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powerful conception, this core free speech precept recognizes the
right of every individual to participate freely and equally in the
speech by which we govern ourselves. As Learned Hand long ago
observed, "public opinion... is the final source of government in a
democratic state."49 Thus, if the government prevents people from
freely participating in the conversation by which this opinion is
formed, the people are no longer self-governing."
The opportunity for each citizen to participate in public
discourse is vital to the legitimacy of the entire legal system." If an
individual is excluded from participating in public discourse because
the government disagrees with his views or finds his ideas too
disturbing or dangerous, any decision taken as a result of that
discussion would with respect to that person lack legitimacy. This
right to participate equally in public discourse free of government-
imposed content restriction is thus not just a collective interest, but a
fundamental individual right that government may legitimately
infringe, if at all, only in truly extraordinary circumstances. 2 Thus,
even if the government could persuasively demonstrate that protests
in the United States against the war in Iraq both dispirit our troops
and encourage the insurgents to continue fighting, antiwar protests
still could not be forbidden on these grounds.
While the emphasis of American free speech doctrine is on the
right of speakers to participate in democratic self-governance,
Indeed, while Redish believes that self-realization is the sole value underlying the First
Amendment, he nonetheless seems to share the view that self-governance, if not a core value, is at
least a very important one. Thus, Redish derives his self-realization value from a commitment to
democracy. See infra text accompanying note 115. He also writes that, although the First
Amendment promotes far more than democratic self-governance, "at the very least, the First
Amendment must be deemed to protect the expression that influences and facilitates the voter's
democratic choice in the voting booth." Redish, supra note 1, at 111 n. 124. In addition, Redish
recognizes that the core doctrinal command of "viewpoint neutrality," which he believes is
violated by the denial of "full" First Amendment protection to commercial speech, is "the logical
outgrowth of the nation's original commitment to democratically based rule." Id. at 110.
49. Masses Publ'g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).
50. As James Madison explained at the founding of this Nation, the commitment to popular
sovereignty means that "the censorial power is in the people over the Government, and not in the
Government over the people." 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 934 (1794).
51. See Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 267, 282 (1991).
52. As I shall discuss in Part 1II.B below, in addition to the concern for legitimacy, the
fundamental precept of the moral equality of each individual is another deep norm undergirding
the right to free and equal participation in the political process. See infra text accompanying
notes 118-119.
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audience interests are a core concern as well, but only in the space
created by the important limitation on the reasons that government
may regulate speech. Specifically, when addressing us as the
ultimate governors in a democratic society, government may not
limit speech because it believes that this speech will lead us to make
unwise or even disastrous social policy decisions.53 To regulate
speech for this reason would violate the core democratic norm that
the people are, collectively, the ultimate sovereigns and, individually,
have a right to free and equal participation in the political process. 4
For two reasons, this right to participate in democratic self-
governance, both as a speaker and audience, is properly referred to as
the core free speech norm. First, this norm explains the pattern of
decided cases far better than does any other contender. While it may
not explain every case,55 it explains the great majority, and is
contradicted by none. In addition, befitting a core constitutional
norm, these participatory interests constitute a right in the strong
sense of that term: an interest possessed by an individual that cannot
be violated even on a single occasion just because general social
utility would be maximized if it were sacrificed. 6 Thus, regulations
that infringe this right of free and equal participation are invariably
held unconstitutional even if the government can show that harm
might result if the speech is left unregulated. 7
These core participatory interests do not, however, exhaust the
democracy-based interests served by the First Amendment. Even
when the government has a legitimate reason for restricting speech,
and there are no core speaker interests at issue, the audience might
still have an overriding interest in receiving information needed to
53. Weinstein, supra note 24, at 514-15.
54. As the Court explained in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978),
"[T]he people in our democracy are entrusted with the responsibility for judging and evaluating
the relative merits of conflicting arguments .... [l]f there be any danger that the people cannot
evaluate the information and arguments ... , it is a danger contemplated by the Framers of the
First Amendment." Id. at 791-92.
55. See infra text accompanying notes 58-74.
56. See RONALD DwORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, at xi (1977).
57. As discussed above, the right to protest against the United States' involvement in a war
is not defeasible even if such a protest would harm the war effort. See supra text accompanying
notes 52-53. Nor does the First Amendment allow government to excise racist ideas from public
discourse even on the quite plausible grounds that such expression leads to discrimination against
minorities. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 28, at 52-59; see also Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343
(2003); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
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develop informed views on public policy matters. 8 To vindicate this
interest, the Court has on occasion extended First Amendment
protection to speech or activity just because it provides information
needed for informed decision making on matters of public concern. 9
This norm cannot, however, be properly characterized as a core First
Amendment value. Assuring the flow of information likely to enrich
public discourse apart from any speaker's interest involved in its
dissemination is a concern instrumental to the proper functioning of
democracy, not constitutive of it. Thus, government interference
with information flow (unless instituted for the illegitimate reasons
discussed above) would not infringe an individual right in the strong
58. This view was famously expounded by Alexander Meiklejohn, who wrote that the First
Amendment does not require that "on every occasion, every citizen shall take part in public
debate.... What is essential is not that everyone shall speak, but that everything worth saying
shall be said." ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION To SELF-
GOVERNMENT 25 (1948). Contrary to Meiklejohn, however, American free speech doctrine is
particularly concerned with the opportunity of "every citizen [to] take part in public debate." See
Robert Post, Meiklejohn 's Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform of Public Discourse, 64
U. COLO. L. REV. 1109, 1115 (1993) ("Traditional First Amendment doctrine, and a broad
spectrum of modern political theories, . . . locat[e] the normative essence of democracy in the
opportunity to participate in the formation of the 'will of the community' through 'a running
discussion between majority and minority."' (quoting HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW
AND STATE 284-88 (Anders Wedberg trans., 1949))). Thus, no matter how many times we have
all heard the message that Osama bin Laden is evil, I still have a right to voice that view in public
discourse.
59. The Court has thus created a very narrow right of access when it is a "necessary
precondition" to assuring access to information through which an "individual citizen can
effectively participate in and contribute to our republican system of self government." Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982). In addition, the Court, in a 5-4
decision, invalidated a Massachusetts law strictly limiting political contributions or expenditures
by corporations "for the purpose of ... influencing or affecting the vote on any question
submitted to the voters." First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 768 (1978)
(internal quotation marks omitted). The restriction was challenged by corporations prevented
from spending money to oppose a proposed amendment to the Massachusetts Constitution
authorizing a graduated income tax. In responding to the contention that corporations have no
First Amendment right to speak, the Court, in an opinion by Justice Powell, responded that "[t]he
Constitution often protects interests broader than those of the party seeking their vindication" and
noted that "[t]he First Amendment, in particular, serves significant societal interests." Id. at 776.
The Court found that the speech the corporations in this case wished to engage in "is the type of
speech indispensable to decision making in a democracy." Id. at 777 & n. 11 (citing, inter alia,
MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 58, at 24-26).
Particularly relevant to the issue of the proper level of protection to be afforded
commercial speech, in extending First Amendment protection to commercial speech, the Court
relied in part on the "general public interest" in the "free flow of commercial information." See,
e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 764
(1976); see also Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 783 ("A commercial advertisement is constitutionally
protected not so much because it pertains to the seller's business as because it furthers the societal
interest in the 'free flow of commercial information."' (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425
U.S. at 764)).
148 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:133
sense of the term. Confirming that laws impeding public access to
information needed for democratic decision making do not implicate
a core First Amendment right, the Court often defers to legislative
judgments that restrictions on information relevant to matters of
public concern are justified by some greater social welfare
consideration." Thus, the interest in information flow needed for
public decision making is properly characterized as a secondary
norm.
6 1
Another popular candidate for the fundamental norm underlying
the American free speech principle is the search for knowledge and
"truth" in the marketplace of ideas. Although this rationale has long
informed American free speech doctrine ,62 it is surely not a core
value. Otherwise, the First Amendment would not let the
government distort the marketplace of ideas through propaganda or
maintain a national communications policy that allows media
60. See, for example, McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), which upheld a ban on
expenditures by corporations and labor unions for communications that refer to a clearly
identified candidate for Federal office made 60 days before a general election or 30 days before a
primary election. Invoking "respect for the 'legislative judgment that the special characteristics
of the corporate structure require particularly careful regulation,"' the Court found that
suppression of this speech is justified by the interest in curtailing the "'corrosive and distorting
effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate
form and that have little or no correlation to the public's support,"' as well as in preventing
"'circumvention of [valid] contribution limits' imposed on these entities. Id. at 205 (alteration in
original) (quoting FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 155 (2003); see also Austin v. Mich.
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 654 (1990) (upholding a state law prohibiting
"corporations from using corporate treasury funds for independent expenditures in support of, or
in opposition to, any candidate in elections for state office"); Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467
U.S. 20, 34-35 (1984) (rejecting a First Amendment challenge to a protective order in a civil suit
preventing a party from disclosing information of public concern obtained in discovery, the Court
cites state interest in preventing potential discovery abuse and in protecting privacy rights of
litigants and third parties as justification for restricting the information). But see FEC v. Wis.
Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007) (sustaining an as-applied First Amendment challenge
to a portion of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, which was upheld against a facial challenge
in McConnell, 540 U.S. 93).
61. At some extreme point, inadequate access to information can be said to impair the core
democratic precept of popular sovereignty, for without a certain quantum of information available
to them, in no meaningful sense can the people be said to be governing society.
62. First invoked by John Milton in the seventeenth century, see JOHN MILTON,
AREOPAGITICA (1644), reprinted in JOHN MILTON, PROSE SELECTIONS 201-68 (Merritt Y.
Hughes ed., Odyssey Press 1947), the truth-discovery rationale for free speech was more fully
developed in the middle of the nineteenth century by John Stuart Mill. See JOHN STUART MILL,
ON LIBERTY (David Bromwich & George Kateb eds., Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1859). Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes then introduced the rationale into Supreme Court jurisprudence, writing
that "the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas" and that "the best test of
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market." Abrams
v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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concentration.63 Another shortcoming with the marketplace of ideas
rationale is that the entire premise that a completely unregulated
market of ideas will lead either to discovery of truth or to social
progress is highly contestable.' An even more fundamental problem
with the marketplace of ideas rationale as a core free speech norm is
that it justifies free speech in terms of the good it will produce for
society as a whole, not as an individual right. Thus as a prominent
theorist has concluded, the "marketplace of ideas theory is
fundamentally unsound both normatively and descriptively."65
Despite the lip service that the Supreme Court has paid to the
marketplace of ideas,66 if ever squarely presented with the question,
the Court would, I believe, conclude that speech that promoted only
this value is entitled to much less rigorous protection than that
accorded the speech by which we govern ourselves. Such a result
would be consistent with a recent case that refused to apply any
meaningful scrutiny to a copyright law that arguably robbed the
pubic domain of important ideas and information.67 Far from a core
free speech norm, the marketplace of ideas rationale is at most a
peripheral value.
Several prominent commentators, including Redish, have argued
that the core First Amendment value is to be found among the cluster
of norms comprising individual autonomy, self-expression, and self-
fulfillment.68 But whatever might be said of these various theories as
a normative matter, they simply do not describe current free speech
doctrine. Indeed, Redish concedes that the commitment to the
"development of the individual's powers and abilities" or to "the
individual's control of his or her own destiny through making life-
affecting decisions" is inconsistent with the entire concept of
63. See James Weinstein, Database Protection and the First Amendment, 28 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 305, 324, 344-48 (2002).
64. See id. at 324 n.109.
65. C. Edwin Baker, First Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55 VAND. L. REV. 891, 897
(2002).
66. See, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) ("It is the purpose of
the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will
ultimately prevail .... ").
67. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 204 (2003).
68. See, e.g., C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1989); David
A.J. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the First Amendment,
123 U. PA. L. REV. 45 (1975); Redish, supra note 26.
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"unprotected speech" such as obscenity and fighting words.69 More
generally, this theory is also belied by the multitude of other types of
speech noted previously that government routinely regulates without
any First Amendment hindrance.7 °
Although autonomy is not a core free speech value, this does not
mean that it has no role to play in current doctrine. In extending
First Amendment protection to ordinary commercial advertising, the
Court noted that, in addition to providing information needed to
decide matters of public concern,71 such speech also aids private
economic decision making. Still, because ordinary commercial
speech is not a constitutive part of the speech by which we govern
ourselves,73 it is not entitled to the rigorous protection primarily
reserved for public discourse.74 Redish does not quarrel with the
observation that ordinary commercial speech is not an essential part
of what he refers to as speech "relevant to the political process."75
69. See Redish, supra note 26, at 593.
70. See supra text accompanying notes 29-30. In addition, such a capacious view of
constitutionally protected decisional autonomy is in tension with the Court's narrow view of
autonomy in its Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process jurisprudence with respect to
such crucial matters as the right of terminally ill people to determine the timing of their death.
See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
71. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765; see also supra note 59. Unlike the
Court and commentators such as Professor Post, I am not persuaded that ordinary commercial
advertising is even instrumentally related to democratic governance in any significant way. See
Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 25 (2000)
(arguing that the constitutional value of commercial speech is that it conveys "information of
relevance to democratic decision making"). I do believe, however, that ordinary commercial
advertising can significantly promote individual economic decision making and, thus, undue
restrictions on this speech can interfere with individual autonomy protected by the Constitution.
See infra text accompanying notes 81-82. While the First Amendment provides an acceptable
source of protection for this interest, grounding a right to receive commercial information in the
liberty provision of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments would, in my view, more accurately
reflect the essence of the interest involved.
72. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 763-64. It remains to be seen how the Court will
reconcile protection of commercial speech under this rationale with its adamant refusal since
1937 to directly afford any meaningful protection to private economic decision making under its
Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process jurisprudence. See KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN &
GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 511 (15th ed. 2004).
73. See Post, supra note 58, at 1115-20.
74. See supra text accompanying notes 31-44, 56-57.
75. As mentioned above, Redish allows that those who believe that the First Amendment is
"primarily or exclusively designed to protect speech relevant to the political process" could in a
principled manner conclude that commercial advertising is not deserving of "full" constitutional
protection. See Redish, supra note 1, at 80-81. He carefully stipulates, however, that this
concession applies only to those who are also willing to relegate to this "second class status" all
other forms of speech about commercial products, including publications such as Consumer
Reports magazine. Id. at 81. Before coming to a definite conclusion about the proper level of
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constitutional protection that should be afforded publications such as Consumer Reports, I would
want to carefully study the function that these publications perform in our society. My tentative
view, however, is that these publications do not have sufficient connection to the "political
process" to warrant the "full protection" that I and others believe is properly reserved primarily
for public discourse. (For a discussion of the meaning of "full" First Amendment protection, see
supra text accompanying note 31.) Rather, like commercial speech, the constitutional value of
publications such as Consumer Reports would seem to inhere primarily in the information that
they provide to the consumer. See supra note 59 and infra note 83.
This similarity does not mean, however, that Consumer Reports and ordinary
commercial advertising are necessarily entitled to an identical level of First Amendment
protection, especially with respect to false or misleading factual statements. As Redish notes,
there is a plausible argument that because of the different motivations for conveying the
information, Consumer Reports generally supplies more objective and accurate information to the
audience. See Redish, supra note 1, at 81. Accordingly, the fact that publications such as
Consumer Reports may be more valuable from a First Amendment perspective than is speech that
"does no more than propose a commercial transaction," Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va.
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (quoting Pittsburg Press Co. v.
Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)), is arguably alone sufficient
grounds to afford consumer magazines more protection than ordinary commercial speech.
An additional and even stronger justification for such disparate treatment is that
publications like Consumer Reports are arguably more easily "chilled" than is commercial
advertising. Accordingly, in order to prevent fear of product disparagement suits from causing
editors to unduly restrict a particularly useful source of commercial information, publications
such as Consumer Reports arguably need some limited First Amendment immunity for false and
misleading statements of facts. See Suzuki Motor Corp. v. Consumer Union of U.S., 330 F.3d
110 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of hearing en banc) ("Groups
like [Consumer Union] perform a valuable function in our consumer society, but they suffer from
a constant threat of litigation. It's easy for a jury to second-guess experimental design, and every
suit carries the prospect of a massive damages award because the very purpose of a negative
review is to convince the reader that the plaintiff's product is not worth buying."). In contrast, the
valuable information that commercial advertising provides is not as likely to be deterred if, as is
the current state of the law, false or misleading commercial speech is afforded no First
Amendment protection. See supra notes 3, 9; see also Va. St. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976) ("[C]ommercial speech may be more
durable than other kinds. Since advertising is the sine qua non of commercial profits, there is
little likelihood of its being chilled by proper regulation and forgone entirely."). Thus even if it
were assumed that publications such as Consumer Reports and ordinary commercial speech are
equally valuable from a First Amendment perspective, Consumer Reports' greater propensity to
be "chilled" provides a "coherent, non-viewpoint-based justification," Redish, supra note 1, at
122, for providing consumer publications greater First Amendment protection than is afforded
ordinary commercial speech.
Redish objects the "numerous categories of speakers who are obviously and
unambiguously motivated by personal gain, yet whose speech unquestionably receives full First
Amendment protection," citing "welfare mothers picketing for increased benefits, anti-taxation
groups, labor unions, and political lobbying groups." Id. at 85-86. All of the examples Redish
cites, however, involve expression that is plainly part of public discourse, a realm in which
speech is afforded extraordinary protection not to primarily protect the audience interest in
receiving information but to safeguard the right of individuals to participate freely and safely in
the political process. See text accompanying notes 31-32. Since this special immunity is
designed chiefly to protect core speaker interests rather than information flow, Redish's examples
are simply not germane to the question of whether two types of speech valued primarily for the
information they convey should nonetheless be afforded somewhat different levels of protection.
The question of the level of First Amendment protection publications such as Consumer
Reports should be afforded is a difficult and intriguing question, one worthy of a symposium of
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Rather, he makes the much deeper objection that it is "illogical" to
support giving less protection to commercial speech than to political
speech because the normative underpinnings of both individual and
collective self-governance are identical.76 It is to this claim that I
now turn.
III. THE DIFFERENT VALUES SERVED BY COLLECTIVE AND
INDIVIDUAL SELF-GOVERNANCE
Redish argues that although it may be principled for those who
believe that the core free speech value is democratic self-governance
to advocate affording commercial speech less protection than
political speech, this view is "illogical" because "it fails to determine
the normative reasons our system would choose democracy in the
first place."" Redish asserts that "speech concerning commercial
products and services can facilitate private self-government in much
the same way that political speech fosters collective self-
government."78 He then insists that "private and collective self-
government are grounded in identical normative concerns about self-
development and self-determination."79 He therefore concludes that
"it makes absolutely no sense to protect speech relevant to a situation
where the individual has a minuscule fraction of a say in the outcome
while simultaneously refusing to protect speech that will facilitate
choices by the private individual that are solely her own."80
A. Democratic Norms and the Limits of Logic
I agree with Redish that the information provided by ordinary
commercial speech can facilitate autonomy and self-fulfillment. As I
have previously written, knowing where to find a commercial
product or service or how to obtain them at the lowest price can
its own. Indeed, the question is so difficult that that when squarely faced with the question, the
Court avoided deciding the level of protection to which Consumer Reports is entitled. See Bose
Corp. v. Consumer Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 513 (1984) (assuming but expressing "no
view" on whether the New York Times malice standard is applicable to product disparagement
suits against consumer magazines). This question is thus much too difficult and complex to serve
as a shibboleth to detect invidious viewpoint discrimination.
76. See Redish, supra note 1, at 81.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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facilitate people carrying out their life plans.8' Locating a much
needed prescription drug at an affordable price can often make the
difference between good and poor health and sometimes even
between life and death.82 And even when the stakes are not so high,
access to commercial information can promote autonomy and self-
fulfillment, for example, by informing consumers about more
mundane products such as automobiles, mortgages, hotel
accommodations, and airfares. I disagree, however, that commercial
speech promotes individual self-governance "in much the same way"
that political speech promotes collective self-governance.
Commercial speech is protected primarily, if not exclusively, for the
information it provides to the audience.83 In contrast, political
speech-and more generally, public discourse84 -is protected not
primarily for its informational value, but because in a democratic
society each citizen has a right to participate in the process by which
we determine our collective fate.85 Relatedly, and more profoundly, I
disagree that individual and collective self-governance are rooted in
"identical normative concerns about self-development and self-
determination."86  Since the crux of Redish's charge is that it is
"illogical" for those who think that the core First Amendment value
is democratic self-governance to advocate lesser protection for
commercial speech,87 I will now examine this claim in detail.
81. See James Weinstein, In Search of the Constitutional Value of Commercial Speech,
http://firstamendmentcenter.org/faclibrary.bookreview.aspx?id=18 (last visited Oct. 5, 2007)
(reviewing ROGER SHINER, FREEDOM OF COMMERCIAL EXPRESSION (2003)).
82. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 763-64.
83. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978) ("A commercial
advertisement is constitutionally protected not so much because it pertains to the seller's business
as because it furthers the societal interest in the 'free flow of commercial information."' (quoting
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 764)); Post, supra note 71, at 14-15 ("Commercial speech
doctrine ... is sharply audience oriented. From a constitutional point of view, the censorship of
commercial speech does not endanger the process of democratic legitimation. It does not threaten
to alienate citizens from their government or to render the state heteronomous with respect to
speakers. Instead it merely jeopardizes the circulation of information relevant to 'the voting of
wise decisions."' (quoting MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 58, at 25)). Unlike Professor Post, however,
I believe that the more salient audience interest served by the free flow of commercial
information is individual, not collective, decision making. See supra note 71.
84. See supra text accompanying note 31.
85. See supra text accompanying notes 48-54; Post, supra note 71, at 12-13.
86. See Redish, supra note 1, at 81.
87. See id.
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In a previous work, Redish elaborates on what he believes to be
the essential normative connection between individual and collective
self-determination:
Our society chooses to function as a democracy for the very
reason that we value individual autonomy and self-
realization. Otherwise, democracy could not be morally
justified. Society, after all, is made up of individuals, and if
one places no value on a single individual's exercise of
autonomy, it is impossible to justify placing a value on the
collective exercise of autonomy .... [We value] a
democratic form of government because... democracy
enables individuals to develop their human faculties and
control their own destinies....
... The concept of free speech, then, flows from the
same overarching value that underlies the commitment to
democracy in the first place, and if society chooses the
latter political structure, society also must protect the
former.8
Redish thus asserts that the position that self-realization is the core
free speech value "can be proven" because "the moral norms
inherent in the choice of our specific form of democracy logically
imply the broader value, self-realization."89
While it is plausible to posit self-realization as the raison d 'tre
of democracy, this conclusion does not as Redish asserts "logically"
flow from the premise of democratic self-governance. It is also
plausible to assert, as I do, that some other moral value, such as
equality or legitimacy-not to mention a host of instrumental
concerns, such as stability, prosperity, and avoidance of tyranny-is
the primary reason we value democracy. I will argue below that
88. Martin H. Redish & Howard M. Wasserman, What's Good for General Motors:
Corporate Speech and the Theory of Free Expression, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 235, 245-46
(1998).
89. Redish, supra note 26, at 594. By "self-realization," Redish means both the
"development of the individual's powers and abilities" and the "individual's control of his or her
own destiny through making life-affecting decisions." Id. at 593. In his view this is the "one true
value" served by free speech. Id. In the material quoted in text accompanying note 88 supra,
Redish also refers to the related but thinner concept of "individual autonomy" which he
apparently uses here as limited to individual decision making. In Part III.C, below, I deal
separately with the relationship between democracy and autonomy.
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equality and legitimacy, or at least the commitment to free and equal
participation in the political process that these values serve, are not
only a plausible explanation of free speech doctrine, but a much
better explanation of that practice than self-realization." But here, I
want to emphasize that political equality and legitimacy are very
different values than self-realization, as are the instrumental concerns
I just mentioned. Thus, one can logically value the equal moral
worth of each individual and the legitimacy that the opportunity to
participate in the political process bestows on the legal system
without embracing a commitment to the "development of the
individual's powers and abilities."'" Similarly, one can for
instrumental reasons value a system that is most likely to provide
stability and respect for at least basic human rights without being
committed to a concept of autonomy requiring that individuals
control their "own destiny through making life-affecting decisions."92
Pace Redish, the question of the norms that underlie democracy is far
too complex and is itself too normatively laden to be decided as a
matter of logic. There is thus simply nothing "illogical" in believing
that free speech is primarily in service of democracy while at the
same time rejecting self-realization as a core free speech value or in
holding that ordinary commercial speech should be afforded
something less than the rigorous First Amendment protection
reserved for political speech and other forms of public discourse.
B. The Relative Merits of Self-Realization
and Participatory Democracy as an
Explanation of Free Speech Doctrine
Self-realization may well be an important or even core value of
American democracy. But before coming to a conclusion about the
relationship between democracy and self-realization, I would need to
study the question more deeply than is necessary to rebut Redish's
claim that self-realization flows from a commitment to democracy as
a matter of logic. But whatever the relationship between the overall
practice of democracy and self-realization, Redish's self-realization
90. See infra text accompanying notes 115-119.
91. Redish, supra note 26, at 593.
92. Id. Even if a respect for basic human rights entails a vision of at least minimally
autonomous individuals, it does not necessarily entail this richer view of autonomy. See infra
text accompanying notes 128-136.
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theory is, both descriptively and normatively, a poor explanation of
that aspect of democratic practice instantiated by free speech
doctrine. Descriptively, a self-realization theory fails to account for
the pattern of free speech cases in which a relatively small amount of
expression is rigorously protected, while most is readily regulable.93
Normatively, adopting self-realization as a core value would likely
dilute the rigorous protection needed to assure that American citizens
can freely participate in the formation of public opinion essential to
democracy, including the right to criticize government officials and
policy.
As Redish observes, the self-realization approach "leads to the
view that all forms of expression are equally valuable for
constitutional purposes."94 But as he also recognizes, his approach
will require "balancing" through which even "full constitutional
protection of free expression may be forced to give way to
competing social concerns."95 For instance, in Redish's view, face-
to-face insults (so called "fighting words"), which are presently
bereft of First Amendment protection, would receive "full"
constitutional protection. Redish emphasizes, however, that such
"full" protection does not mean that "fighting words should receive
absolute protection, any more than any other form of expression
deserves such a guarantee offreedom."96 Rather, in Redish's view,
whether one has a right in a particular situation to use fighting words
or to engage in any other form of expression, depends upon "a
careful weighing of competing interests."97 Though I prefer the
current approach of a narrowly defined category of fighting words
entitled to no First Amendment protection, I have no strong objection
to subjecting fighting words to such an ad hoc balancing test. But
subjecting core political speech to such an amorphous procedure
would greatly reduce the near absolute protection from content
regulation that such speech currently enjoys. In addition, it would
93. See supra text accompanying notes 30-44.
94. Redish, supra note 26, at 595.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 626 (emphasis added).
97. Id.
Fall 2007] PROTECTION OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH 157
invite the very judicial viewpoint discrimination that Redish rightly
deplores. 98
Consider, for instance, how a critique of immigration policy that
contained a vicious attack upon the Muslim religion would fare
under such an amorphous balancing test. If cases in other
democracies that "balance" the right to engage in offensive political
speech against "competing social concerns"
99 are any guide, 100
Americans might lose their right to express "hateful" ideas about
groups of people as part of public discourse.
Redish will no doubt object that the goal of his theory is to raise
the level of protection afforded to speech that currently enjoys no
protection or less than "full" protection, not to reduce the level that
certain privileged types of speech now enjoy. He would thus
apparently protect all speech unless the government had a
"compelling need to prevent harm (narrowly defined), usually
physical harm."' 1 But even if courts were to adopt Redish's view
that all speech should receive "full" constitutional protection, it is
extremely doubtful that they would adopt the rigorous standard he
proposes as the test for regulating the content of all speech. There
98. See James Weinstein, Free Speech, Abortion Access, and the Problem of Judicial
Viewpoint Discrimination, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 471, 481-85 (1996).
99. Redish, supra note 26, at 595.
100. For example, in Regina v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (Can.), the Canadian Supreme
Court held that the right of individuals to express racist and anti-Semitic ideas as part of public
discourse was outweighed by various competing societal interests, including: preventing
members of groups vilified in such speech from feeling "humiliated and degraded," id. at 746;
reducing the risk of "serious discord between various cultural groups," id. at 747; and protecting
"the enthusiasm with which the value of equality is accepted and acted upon by society," id. at
758.
Similarly, in the United Kingdom in 2004, and again in 2006, Nick Griffin, the leader of
the British National Party, was criminally charged under Britain's law against incitement to racial
hatred for calling Islam a "wicked, vicious faith" in a speech to his supporters. See Martin
Wainwright, Cabinet Rethinks Race Hate Laws After Jury Frees BNP Leaders, GUARDIAN
(U.K.), at 6, Nov. 11, 2006, available at http://politics.guardian.co.uk/farright/story/
0,, 1945265,00.html. After he was twice acquitted by a jury, the government called for review of
the existing laws with an eye toward prohibiting such speech. Id. (The acquittals may have
resulted because the jury concluded that insulting Islam, even in the context of criticizing
immigration reform, was not an incitement to "racial" hatred.) In another British case, a member
of the British National Party was convicted under the Public Order Act of 1986 for displaying a
poster in the window of his house depicting one of the twin towers of the World Trade Center in
flames, together with a crescent and star surrounded by a prohibition sign, and stating "Islam out
of Britain" and "Protect the British People." See Norwood v. Dir. Pub. Prosecutions [2003]
EWHC (Admin) 1564, discussed in Ivan Hare, Crosses, Crescents and Sacred Cows:
Criminalising Incitement to Religious Hatred, PUB. L. 521, 521 (2006).
101. Redish, supra note 1, at 98.
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are numerous examples of speech that can cause harm other than
physical injury, such as misleading proxy statements, profanity in the
classroom, negligently written instructions on consumer products,
and works that infringe copyright, to mention just a few. While
government has a legitimate, or perhaps even a substantial or
important, need to prevent or redress harms such as these, it does not
have a "compelling" need to do so, at least not as that term is used in
current jurisprudence.' 2 I am fairly certain, however, that if Redish's
view that all speech must be given the same level of protection were
formally adopted, courts would nonetheless continue to allow
government to regulate most, if not all, of this expression on the
basis of its content.' °3 Since the test for regulating "fully" protected
speech would then be far less rigorous in practice if not in name,"
my fear is that the fierce protection currently given core political
speech will be diminished if thrown in the same hopper as other
types of speech that cause harm.
And political speech can cause harm. A public official can be
harmed by false accusations about his personal life in a political
diatribe, just as advocacy of law violation can persuade others to
break the law or even commit acts of violence. Or to return to the
example of a critic of immigration policy who wants to bar the door
to Muslims: vicious condemnation of Islam might well cause
emotional injury to Muslims presently living in this country and,
furthermore, might make them feel insecure about their rights,
especially if the speaker engages in such "self-expressive" epithets
102. With very few exceptions, application of the "compelling" interest standard as used in
the Supreme Court's free speech jurisprudence leads to invalidation of a law restricting speech.
See WEINSTEIN, supra note 28, at 39.
103. I suspect that Redish too might find at least some of expression on this list
constitutionally proscribable. I would predict, for instance, that he would permit a third grade
teacher in a public elementary school to discipline a student who as a means of self-expression
continually used the "scurrilous epithet" favored by the defendant in Cohen v. California, 403
U.S. 15, 22 (1971) (upholding right of anti-war protestor to wear a jacket with the message "Fuck
the Draft"). Or even if he would not so limit the expressive rights of the student, I would expect
(and hope) that he would allow the state to prevent elementary school teachers from using this
expletive in the classroom.
104. Courts might still use the terms "compelling state interest" and "strict scrutiny" to refer
to a massively watered down version of the current test. Cf ERIC BARENDT, supra note 15, at
174-75 ("The best argument for restricting racist hate speech is undoubtedly that a state has a
compelling interest to protect members of target groups against the psychological injuries
inflicted by the most pernicious forms of extremist hate speech."); Erwin Chemerinsky, Remarks
at the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Symposium: Commercial Speech: Past, Present &
Future (Feb 23, 2007).
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such as "cockroach" to refer to them."' Arguably, the prevalence of
such expression might even make it more likely that others will
engage in illegal discrimination against Muslims. °6 Indeed, core
political speech could even lead to physical injury or death, such as
might be the case with anti-war protests that have the effect of
encouraging insurgents in Iraq to keep attacking American troops in
the hope that public opinion here will lead to the withdrawal of our
forces. Yet despite the harm such expression can cause, American
citizens currently have a right to make negligently libelous
statements about government officials;"7 to advocate lawless conduct
up the point of incitement;0 8 to deliver anti-Islamic diatribes as part
of public discourse;'0 9 and to denounce our country's war effort even
if it encourages the enemy to fight harder.
As the routine regulation of many types of self-expressive
speech demonstrates, °"0 the reason certain types of speech are
afforded immunity from the usual legal precept that harmful activity
may be suppressed cannot possibly be to vindicate self-expression or
self-realization. Rather, this special immunity from the normal
operation of the law is made available to public discourse because
individuals have a fundamental right to freely participate in the
speech by which we govern ourselves. In the words of Justice
William Brennan: "[S]peech concerning public affairs is more than
self-expression; it is the essence of self-government."'' . If, as Redish
advocates, all speech is entitled to the same protection, and the
unitary standard for protecting speech is appropriate for promoting
self-fulfillment,"2 then the special immunity presently afforded
105. British National Party activist, Mark Collett, a co-defendant in the prosecution of Nick
Griffin discussed supra note 100, was charged with inciting racial hatred for referring to asylum-
seekers as "cockroaches." Martin Wainwright, Retrial Begins of BNP Leaders Accused of
Stirring Racial Hatred, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Nov. 4, 2006, at 6, available at http://politics.guardian
.co.uk/farright/story/0,, 193935 1,00.html.
106. See R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (Can.) (upholding a ban on hate speech,
Canadian Supreme Court noted that such speech might lead to "discrimination, and perhaps even
violence, against minority groups in Canadian society").
107. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
108. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
109. See supra note 57.
110. See supra text accompanying notes 28-30, 33-36.
111. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964).
112. It could certainly be argued that racist or other types of hate speech interfere with the
right to "self-fulfillment" of members of the victimized groups, and that such harm outweighs the
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political speech despite the harm that it can sometimes cause would
likely disappear."13
In my view, a much preferable free speech doctrine is the
present one, which rigorously protects speech that is part of
democratic self-governance but which allows most other types of
expression to be regulated if the government has a legitimate reason
for doing so. Thus, not only does a democracy-based theory describe
current doctrine much better than does Redish's self-realization
theory, it is also normatively more attractive because it reserves the
most stringent protection for an interest that virtually everyone
agrees is a fundamental right: the opportunity to participate on a free
and equal basis in the speech through which society's collective
decisions are made.
It is telling that in attempting to root his self-realization theory
in a firm foundation rather than on "some unsupportable, conclusory
assertions of moral value,"'' 4 Redish attempts to reason "from what
we in this nation take as given: our democratic system of
government."" 5 Redish, however, fails to show a necessary or even
close connection between democracy and self-realization, thus
leaving his self-realization theory hovering in mid-air. In contrast,
the participatory democracy theory of free speech that I espouse is
rooted firmly in democracy. I would not go so far as to claim that
the very concept of democracy "logically" implies that each citizen
has an equal right to participate in the political process, including the
speech by which public issues are decided. But such a right is
speaker's minimal self-fulfillment in making hateful comments as part of public discourse. See
R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (Can.).
113. Of course, there are those that would applaud such a result, especially as it might be
applied to racist, sexist, homophobic, or seditious public discourse. But I suspect that, like me,
Professor Redish would not be among them.
114. Redish, supra note 26, at 594. In criticizing Professor C. Edwin Baker's "liberty" model
of the First Amendment, Redish explains that he might agree with Baker's foundational view that
for the community to legitimately expect individuals to respect collective decisions, "the
community must respect individuals as equal, rational and autonomous moral beings." Id. at 594
n.20 (internal quotes omitted). But, Redish continues, if someone denied that the obligation to
obey the law had anything to do with the government's respect for the individual, Baker would
have little more to say than "Oh, yes it does." Id. However, since democracy does not "logically
imply" self-realization as Redish claims, id. at 594, and since he fails to make any substantial
argument about the relationship between democracy and self-realization, Redish's theory is on no
firmer footing than Baker's. Thus, according to Redish's own criteria for a foundational theory,
his theory should be summarily rejected.
115. Redish, supra note 26, at 594.
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undeniably a basic premise of contemporary American democracy."6
Unlike self-realization, this formal right of equal political
participation is so intimately related to the practice of democracy in
this country that it is, to borrow Redish's phrase, "take[n] as
given"" 7 and, thus, forms a solid foundation for constitutional theory.
While there may be a consensus that in a modem democratic
society each person has a formal right to equal participation in the
political process, the deeper norms that justify this right are both
more obscure and contentious. I have already mentioned legitimacy
as one crucial norm vindicated by this right of participation." 8
Another core norm that can be seen as underlying this right is the
precept of equal moral worth. Ever since the idea of moral equality
was loosed upon the world, there has been perpetual debate about
what this precept entails. There is now, however, general agreement
that this precept includes at least formal or procedural equality in the
political process. This is not to deny that there may be other core
values besides legitimacy and formal equality underlying democracy
writ large. But these two values would seem to be the best
explanation of that aspect of democracy-the individual right of
equal participation-of which free speech is a constitutive part.
Among other things, these values explain why the right to participate
in the discussion by which collective decisions are made is thought
of as a fundamental right worthy of protection even if its exercise
might cause harm sufficient to justify the suppression of an ordinary
exercise of individual liberty. But whether or not formal equality
and legitimacy are the best explanations of the deep moral norms
underlying the American free speech principle, they are surely better
explanations than self-realization.'
116. As well as being reflected in such doctrines as the "one person, one vote" requirement,
see Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), the right to equal participation is also the best
explanation of the free speech doctrine's intense hostility toward viewpoint discrimination. It is
thus no coincidence that the case that first introduced the rule against content discrimination into
modem doctrine technically rested on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
See Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); see also Redish, supra note 1, at 118 ("Few, if
any, knowledgeable observers would dispute the inherently invidious nature of viewpoint-based
discrimination in light of the manner in which it inevitably undermines the values served by
democracy and the system of free expression of which it is a part.").
117. See Redish, supra note 26, at 594.
118. See supra text accompanying notes 51-52.
119. It bears emphasizing that even if I am wrong about the deeper values that underlie the
right to free and equal participation in the political process, this would not undercut the consensus
that American citizens have a right to free and equal participation in the political process.
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C. The Relationship Between Democracy and Individual Autonomy
I want to end this discussion of the normative essence of
democracy with a tip of my hat to Professor Redish. Such is
Redish's enormous talent as a constitutional law scholar that even
when he defends an untenable thesis, as I believe he has here, he
cannot help but raise interesting and important issues. As discussed
above, although I leave open the possibility that the best explanation
of the deepest norm underlying American democracy may be some
version of self-realization, I disagree with Redish that a commitment
to democracy logically entails such a norm. Redish is on much
firmer ground, though, to the extent that he makes the much less
ambitious claim that a commitment to democracy logically entails a
vision of individual citizens as autonomous agents.' ° Redish writes:
"Society, after all, is made up of individuals, and if one places no
value on a single individual's exercise of autonomy, it is impossible
to justify placing a value on the collective exercise of autonomy."12
'
I agree that the practice of participatory democracy requires a robust
vision of the autonomy of the participants. I believe, however, that
this ascription of autonomy extends to individuals only to the extent
that they are participating in the practice of democracy but not
beyond. In contrast, Redish believes that the commitment to
democracy logically entails a vision of fully autonomous beings for
all purposes, including private decision making.
When government addresses us in our capacity as the ultimate
sovereigns in a democratic society, such as when it attempts to
regulate public discourse, it must treat us as fully autonomous and
rational agents.' Thus, it would be per se impermissible for
government to outlaw arguments in favor of repealing bans on
smoking in public places on the grounds that the people are not
Although identifying the core free speech norm as a commitment to equal political participation
might cry out for deeper normative exploration, it is perhaps as normatively deep as we can go
without losing what is arguably the only point of consensus among all informed observers about
at least one important value underlying the First Amendment. See generally Cass R. Sunstein,
Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REv. 1733 (1995).
120. See supra text accompanying note 88.
121. Redish & Wasserman, supra note 88, at 245.
122. "[T]he people in our democracy are entrusted with the responsibility for judging and
evaluating the relative merits of conflicting arguments.... []f there be any danger that the people
cannot evaluate the information and arguments .... it is a danger contemplated by the Framers of
the First Amendment." First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791-92 (1978); see
Weinstein, supra note 16, at 1104-06; see also supra text accompanying notes 53-54.
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sufficiently rational to sort out the various arguments on the subject,
some of which will undoubtedly be tendentious and misleading, or to
properly weigh the dire health consequences from secondhand smoke
if the ban were repealed." 3 Allowing the government to restrict
speech on this ground would be inconsistent with the premise that in
a democracy the ultimate sovereign is the people, not the
government. And in our democracy at least, this right to ultimate
sovereignty is an individual right, not merely a collective one. Thus,
even if a majority of the people wanted to restrict speech because it
might lead the people to make some foolish social policy decision, it
would still be impermissible to do so.
In contrast, when addressing us in some capacity other than as
ultimate sovereigns in a democratic society, such as consumer,
motorist, or patient, this strong precept of autonomy inherent in
democracy is not applicable precisely because these activities are not
part of this democratic project.'24 Thus, the government may treat us
as not fully rational or autonomous agents in protecting us from
misleading commercial advertisements, requiring us to wear
motorcycle helmets, or restricting what doctors may say to us.'25
It could be argued that this dichotomy makes no sense: we either
are or are not fully rational, autonomous beings. But the requirement
that the government treat us as fully rational, autonomous agents in
our capacity as ultimate political sovereigns flows not from a
description of human psychology or the human condition; rather, it is
an ascription inherent in the basic premise that, as James Madison
explained, "[t]he people, not the government, posses[s] the absolute
sovereignty."' 26 Prohibiting the people from hearing some argument
on a matter of public concern because the government fears that the
people are not sufficiently rational to reach the correct decision
123. This would include a blanket ban on cigarette companies' urging such a repeal if
justified on the ground that self-interested parties would likely give distorted views that would
mislead the people into voting for the repeal. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (invalidating state law
generally prohibiting corporations from making contributions or expenditures for the purpose of
influencing the vote on any question submitted to the voters).
124. See Weinstein, supra note 16, at 1106.
125. See Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the
Constitutional Status of Social Interaction, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 771, 845-46 (1999); Weinstein,
supra note 24, at 520, 532.
126. James Madison, Virginia Resolutions, in 4 JONATHAN ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 569-70
(1836)).
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would, as to that issue at least, invert this basic premise by making
the government, not the people, the ultimate sovereign. But when we
are acting outside of this democratic realm, such as when we are
acting as a consumer, motorist, or patient, this core democratic norm
is not breached if the government treats us in accord with our actual
nature and limitations, that is, as less than fully rational or
autonomous agents.
A more powerful objection to the constitutional ascription of
autonomy to individuals only when acting in their sovereign capacity
is this: the precept that individuals have a right to participate in
collective decision making must presuppose agents with a sufficient
degree of rationality and autonomy to be conceived of as rights-
bearing beings. And with respect to the right to govern in particular,
individuals must be conceived as possessing the minimal ability to
understand and articulate both their own interests and those of
society. Moreover, such agents must have enough independence
from others so that the views they express are their own and not the
product of coercion or undue influence. This is why the exclusion of
children and people with certain types of mental illness or severe
mental retardation from the franchise does not violate the core
precept of participatory democracy. Unlike the rationality and
autonomy ascribed to individuals when acting in their capacity as
ultimate sovereigns in a democratic society, this is an even more
basic presupposition about the nature of individuals in a democratic
society, one needed for the practice of participatory democracy to
make sense. Thus, unlike the ascription of rationality and autonomy
proper to the realm of democratic self-governance, this more basic
view of the individual arguably persists even outside this domain. 27
I therefore agree with Redish that it is difficult to justify the
practice of democracy while placing "no value" on a single
individual's exercise of autonomy, even when that individual is not
involved in the process of collective decision making. But this
127. The objections recounted in this and the preceding paragraph is an amalgam of views
expressed to me in discussions over the years with Larry Alexander, Richard Ameson, Ed Baker,
and Seana Shiffrin. In formulating the description of the minimal autonomy presupposed by
democracy set forth in this and the next paragraph, I greatly benefited from discussions with
Ronald Dworkin, Ross Harrison, Jeffrie Murphy, Robert Post, and Cynthia Stonnington. The two
types of autonomy that I describe here are roughly similar to the dichotomy between ascriptive
and descriptive autonomy described by Richard Fallon. See Richard H. Fallon, Two Senses of
Autonomy, 46 STAN. L. REV. 875 (1994).
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means only that the vision of participatory democracy that I believe
underlies the First Amendment presupposes some degree of
individual autonomy; it by no means entails Redish's view that
individuals must be allowed to control their "own destiny through
making life-affecting decisions."''
The precise nature and parameters of this irreducible residuum
of individual autonomy that flow from a basic presupposition of
participatory democracy and persist even when we are engaged in
purely private decision making are very difficult questions about
which I remain uncertain. How it should be accounted for in
constitutional doctrine is also a difficult question, but one about
which I can offer at least some tentative views. 2 9
As a descriptive matter, we know that this minimum vision of
autonomy does not make paternalistic measures aimed at people
outside the political realm unconstitutional. Current constitutional
doctrine has no general prohibition against paternalism, as is attested
to by the constitutionality of laws mandating use of seat belts and
motorcycle helmets, and outlawing gambling and recreational
drugs. 3 ' Nor, under current doctrine, would there likely be a
constitutional obstacle to a ban on the sale or consumption of
cigarettes even on overtly paternalistic grounds.'
Interestingly, however, suppressing speech for such paternalistic
reasons might well be unconstitutional even if the speech is not part
128. Redish, supra note 26, at 593.
129. Because the minimal autonomy we are examining here is not an underlying value served
by participatory democracy but rather a presupposition of that practice, free speech doctrine
might properly disregard this concern. The following discussion, however, proceeds on the
tentative assumption that constitutional doctrine should (or at least may) properly account not
only for underlying values but for deeper presuppositions underling those values.
130. See David Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. L.
REV. 334, 359 (1991) ("The Constitution does not generally prohibit the government from
paternalistic action; that is well settled. Thus the government would be free to ban gambling even
on strictly paternalistic grounds."); see also Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 68 n. 15
(1973) (noting that the "state statute books are replete with constitutionally unchallenged laws"
against activity that "only directly involve 'consenting adults').
13 1. The level of scrutiny required to protect the minimal autonomy inherent in democracy is
thus itself quite minimal, most likely the rational basis test, which has been aptly described as
"minimal... in theory and virtually none in fact." Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 8 (1972). This does not mean, of course, that this minimal vision of autonomous
individuals in a democratic society should not forbid paternalism or more generally deserve
greater constitutional scrutiny. But such an important normative question is beyond the scope of
this limited inquiry.
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of public discourse. 32 Thus, a substantial constitutional question
would be presented if, rather than banning the sale of cigarettes, the
government decided to reduce demand for the product by forbidding
cigarette advertising.133  Why the supposed greater power to ban a
132. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizen Consumers Council, 425 U.S. 748, 769
(1976) (invalidating a ban on price advertisement by pharmacists, the Court condemns as "highly
paternalistic" the state's argument that customers will buy low cost, low quality pharmaceuticals,
and drive the "professional" pharmacists out of business); Linmark Assocs. v. Willingboro, 431
U.S. 85, 96 (1977) (striking down a town ordinance banning the posting of "For Sale" or "Sold"
signs on residential property in order to stem the flight of white homeowners from an integrated
neighborhood, and explaining that the government does not have the power to restrict the free
flow of information because it fears that otherwise the audience will make decisions inimical to
what the government views as its self-interest); Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357,
374 (2002) (invalidating a federal ban on advertising compounded drugs violates the First
Amendment, and observing that the Court had "previously rejected the notion that the
Government has an interest in preventing the dissemination of truthful commercial information in
order to prevent members of the public from making bad decisions with the information"); see
also 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503 (1996) (opinion of Stevens, J., joined
by Kennedy & Ginsburg, JJ.) ("The First Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical of
regulations that seek to keep people in the dark for what the government perceives to be their own
good.").
However, as Justice Breyer explained in his dissent in Western States Medical Center,
the government's rationale for regulation in that case is not in fact paternalistic:
It is an oversimplification to say that the Government "fear[s]" that doctors or patients
"would make bad decisions if given truthful information." Rather, the Government
fears the safety consequences of multiple compound-drug-prescription decisions
initiated not by doctors but by pharmacist-to-patient advertising. Those consequences
flow from the adverse cumulative effects of multiple individual decisions each of
which may seem perfectly reasonable considered on its own. The Government fears
that, taken together, these apparently rational individual decisions will undermine the
safety testing system, thereby producing overall a net balance of harm.
535 U.S. at 387 (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ.)
(alteration in original) (citation omitted).
Accordingly, despite the Court's use of the term "paternalism," all of the cases discussed
in this footnote, with the exception 44 Liquormart, are perhaps better characterized as involving a
collective action problem rather than a truly paternalistic measure such as was upheld in Posadas
de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 341 (1986) (Court
upholds against First Amendment challenge a Puerto Rican law prohibiting gambling casinos
from advertising their facilities to residents of Puerto Rico justified by the desire to prevent
excessive casino gambling among local residents). For a discussion of collective action
problems, see Wikipedia, Collective Action, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collectiveaction (last
visited Oct. 5, 2007).
133. In National Ass'n of Broadcasters v. Kleindienst, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972) (affirming
Capital Broad. Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.C.D.C. 1971)), the Court summarily affirmed
a three judge district court's decision upholding the constitutionality of a federal ban on cigarette
advertising on radio and television. This case was, however, decided before the Supreme Court
extended First Amendment protection to commercial speech in Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy, 425 U.S. 748 (1976), as well as before the cases condemning "paternalistic" measures
discussed supra note 132. Its continuing validity is therefore in doubt. See generally Lorillard
Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001) (applying Central Hudson test to invalidate on First
Amendment grounds a ban on outdoor advertising of smokeless tobacco and cigars within 1,000
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dangerous product or activity does not include, as the Court once
held that it did,'34 the allegedly lesser power to ban its promotion, is
an interesting question. Since a direct ban on the sale of cigarettes
does not sufficiently implicate individual autonomy to render the law
unconstitutional, it would be difficult to argue that it is some general
commitment to autonomy, such as the minimal autonomy implicit in
democracy that we are now considering, that is offended by the
advertising ban.'35 The best argument that I can think of, though I do
not find it persuasive, is that unlike the sale of cigarettes, cigarette
advertising provides the public with information needed to decide
public issues about smoking and health. 3 6  My purpose here,
however, is not to explore in detail why a ban on cigarette
advertising is a difficult constitutional question, while a ban on
cigarettes themselves is not. Rather, it is to suggest that the
irreducible minimum autonomy that flows from the very premise of
democracy and arguably attaches even outside the realm of
democratic participation is likely not the explanation.
IV. CONCLUSION
Upon initial consideration, the question of the level of protection
commercial speech should receive might seem to be a dry, technical
inquiry. But grappling with this question quickly reveals that it
raises one of the most profound and interesting questions in all of
feet of a school or playground and an indoor point-of-sale requirement that such advertisements
be placed no lower than five feet from the floor).
134. See Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs., 478 U.S. at 345-46 ("In our view, the greater
power to completely ban casino gambling necessarily includes the lesser power to ban advertising
of casino gambling .... "). This greater-includes-the-lesser rationale was seemingly repudiated in
Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 482 n.2 (1996), where the Court rejected a similar
argument in support of a prohibition against revealing the alcoholic content of malt beverages on
product labels, noting that the statement in Posadas occurred only after the majority concluded
that the regulation survived the Central Hudson test; see also 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 511
(opinion of Stevens, J., joined by Kennedy, Thomas & Ginsburg, JJ.) (concluding that the
"greater-includes-the-lesser" rationale should be rejected because it is "inconsistent with both
logic and well-settled doctrine").
135. David Strauss makes an interesting argument that restrictions on speech that persuade
someone from doing something involve a greater intrusion on autonomy than laws that directly
forbid someone from doing the same activity. In Strauss's view, suppressing speech because it
will persuade the audience to do something which the government disapproves of is "similar in
kind (although not in degree) to lies that are told for the purpose of influencing behavior" and,
thus, "involve a denial of autonomy in the sense that they interfere with a person's control over
her own reasoning processes" in ways that an outright ban on the activity does not. See Strauss,
supra note 130, at 354.
136. See supra note 59 and text accompanying note 71.
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constitutional law: whether the First Amendment is primarily an
instrument of democracy, as I think it is, or a key instrument of
liberalism, as Redish maintains. This question, in turn, raises the
even deeper and more difficult question of whether a commitment to
democratic self-governance presuppose autonomous individuals even
when acting in capacities not directly related to self-governance.
I agree with the basic liberal premise that each of us is the
author of our own life, and therefore find most types of paternalism
offensive and unjustifiable. But whether the United States
Constitution generally prohibits such intrusions on personal
autonomy, or whether the propriety of paternalism should instead be
decided by the political process, is a different and much more
difficult questions. If there is such a general constitutional limit on
paternalism, it is, in my view, more properly found in the liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments than as part of the right to free speech protected by the
First Amendment. The primary purpose of the First Amendment is
to set strong and definite constitutional limitations on the
government's ability to interfere with the right of the people, both
collectively and individually, to freely discuss all matters of public
concern. If, however, the First Amendment is made to do work
inappropriate for it, such as protecting a general precept of autonomy
or self-realization, its ability to carry out its primary function will
likely be impaired.
The extent to which the individual right to participate in
collective decision making presupposes autonomous individuals is an
interesting and difficult issue, as is the related question of whether
the First Amendment properly protects such autonomy. It is a pity
that Redish did not spend more time exploring this issue rather than
attacking the motives of those who do not share his view about the
level of protection the First Amendment affords commercial speech.
